In Davis v. State (SC13-6), the Florida Supreme Court denied the appellant’s arguments that his conviction and sentence of death should be overturned on the basis that: “(1) the trial court failed to remain neutral during the penalty-phase proceedings; (2) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating circumstance that Davis committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and the trial court erred in weighing nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; (3) the trial court erred in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance; (4) the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred in giving the standard jury instruction defining the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance; (6) the trial court erred in denying relief based on U.S. Supreme Court case Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (7) the death penalty is not proportionate in this case.”

In Whitton v. State (SC11-2083 and SC12-2522), the Court denied the appellant’s arguments that his conviction and death sentence should be overturned on the basis that the prosecution was corrupt, that the trial counsel did not properly investigate mitigation for sentencing, that there were juror communication issues (specifically that he was denied the chance to interview the jury and that the bailiff and judge communicated with them outside his presence), and that he had ineffective counsel.

In Huggins v. State (SC11-219), the Court denied the appellant’s arguments that his conviction and death sentence should be overturned on the basis that the postconviction court erred in finding him competent, that he had ineffective assistance of counsel, and that there was prosecutorial misconduct.

In Smith v. Southland Suites of Ormond Beach (SC10-631), the Court dismissed the review proceeding based on a lack of jurisdiction. The appeal had centered on provisions of a power of attorney and on apparent authority. The Court had initially found that jurisdiction did exist because of a direct and express conflict, but on further review concluded that it was granted “improvidently”.